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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND
FINANCING AFTER THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984: THE FINAL
CHAPTER?
I. Introduction
Approximately sixteen years after Congress purportedly divested
industrial development bonds (IDB)l of the general tax exemption
accorded interest on state and local obligations, 2 President Reagan
signed into law the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (1984 Act)3 which
contains a substantial number of provisions affecting IDB financing.
Title VII of the 1984 Act places a ceiling on the total dollar amount of
IDBs that each state can issue per calendar year, further restricts
the use of tax-exempt IDB proceeds, and eliminates various loopholes
in the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to IDBs. 4 Ironically, the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation projected, in a report
issued November 15, 1984, that tax-exempt bonds will cost the federal
government more money than it estimated would have been lost had
the Act not been passed.' Coincidently, on November 27, 1984, the
Treasury Department, in its plan to simplify the tax laws, proposed
that virtually all tax-exempt bonds be eliminated. 6
1. Section 103(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) defines the term
"industrial development bond" for federal income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)
(1982). See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text for an explanation of section
103(b)(2). The definition was originally added to the Code as section 103(c)(2) by
the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a),
82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (1968). Industrial development bonds come in two forms,
either (1) general obligations, secured by the taxing power of the issuing government
unit, or (2) revenue bonds, secured only by the property acquired with the bond
proceeds and the income produced by the property. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING 37
(Report A-18, 1963) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMISSION]. See infra note 26
for a discussion of the effect of the distinction.
2. Interest paid on municipal bonds is exempt from federal income tax pursuant
to section 103(a) of the Code. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1982). See infra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the historical development of the interest
exemption. Code section 103(b)(1) read in conjunction with section 103(a) provides,
generally, that interest derived from IDBs is taxable. See I.R.C. §§ 103(a),
103(b)(1) (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
4. See infra notes 126-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
provisions enacted by the Deficit Reduction Act affecting IDB financing.
5. Bond Buyer, Nov. 16, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
6. Bond Buyer, Nov. 28, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. I.
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This Note explores the development and financial and tax ram-
ifications of IDB financing. It then examines the extent to which
the 1984 Act affects traditional uses of IDBs and the future of tax-
exempt industrial development bond financing in light of the Treasury's
proposal. This Note concludes that IDBs should remain a viable
mechanism for financing industrial expansion and essential public
facilities.
II. The Development of IDB Financing
A. Historical Background
An industrial development bond is a debt obligation issued in the
name of a state or local government or its instrumentalities for the
benefit of a private company. 7 The classic 1DB financing scenario
develops when a municipality sells the bonds to finance the acqui-
sition, construction, or rehabilitation of industrial facilities.' The
facilities then are leased to a private company which in turn pays
rent in an amount sufficient to cover interest and amortization of
the bonds.9 Generally, bond purchasers look only to the company's
credit rating in assessing the merits of the bond as an investment
since the obligations are secured by the facility constructed and its
anticipated revenues.10 Typically, issuers employ IDB financing as part
of a multi-faceted program to attract industry into a particular community
7. Ritter, Federal Income Tax Treatment Of Municipal Obligations: Industrial
Development Bonds, 25 TAx LAW. 511, 513 (1972) (general discussion of IDB
financing structure) [hereinafter cited as Ritter].
8. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 37. Prior to the enactment of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
96 Stat. 324, there were no restrictions on the type of facility, commercial or
residential, that could be financed with tax-exempt ID13s. See infra notes 108-25
for a discussion of the restrictions imposed by TEFRA and notes 126-95 for the
restrictions imposed by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494 (1984).
9. Ritter, supra note 7, at 513; Note, The Limited Tax Exempt Status of
Interest on Industrial Development Bonds Under Subsection 103(c) of The Internal
Revenue Code, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Exempt
Status].
10. Ritter, supra note 7, at 513. Opponents of tax-exempt IDB financing per-
suasively argue that the debtor, in reality, is the private company which will use
the facility constructed with the proceeds of the bond. Hence, interest paid on
IDBs should not be exempt under section 103(a) of the Code. See infra notes 44-
63.
11. Two basic theories explain the industrial location decision making process:
revenue maximization and cost minimization. Under the former, firms locate in
areas with the maximum demand for their product. Under the latter, firms build
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for the purposes of promoting economic development 2 and alleviating
unemployment. ' 3
New industries can be attracted to a community because IDBs
offer significant economic advantages for private companies. 14 Under
certain circumstances, interest paid on the bonds is exempt from
federal income taxation. 5 The bonds' tax-exempt status allows the
municipality to borrow at an interest rate approximately two to four
percent below that paid on the lessee's taxable bonds. 16 The reduction
in financing costs is passed on to the private enterprise in the form
facilities where the costs are lowest. Synthesized, companies locate where the
difference between the two are the greatest. Note, State and Local Industrial Location
Incentives-A Well Stocked Candy Store, 5 J. CORP. L. 517, 522 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Location Incentives]. IDBs affect the latter by reducing the cost of acquisition
or construction. Despite the fact that IDB financing can result in substantial cost
savings to industry its effectiveness in inducing new industrial location is uncertain.
Id. at 545. In Mississippi, as a result of an industrial development program, enough
companies were attracted to the state to increase manufacturing employment forty
percent between 1957 and 1965. 114 CONG. REc. 7688 (1968) (statement of Senator
Eastland). Senator Hollings, however, contends that his state, South Carolina,
competed with Mississippi for industry and for four years attracted more industry
than Mississippi without issuing IDBs. See 114 CONG. REC. 7686 (1968) (statement
of Senator Hollings).
12. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3-4. Initially IDBs were pre-
dominantly issued by underdeveloped states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky,
and Mississippi. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1651 n.13. These states had surplus
farm labor problems. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 38. IDBs have
cured these problems to some extent. See discussion supra note 11.
13. See ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3-4. "IT]he beneficial impact
on employment is proportionately most significant in smaller projects financed by
IDBs; as the size of the projects increases their relative return in creating jobs
diminishes." Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1660.
14. Non-economic attractions offered by a community include the existence of
a skilled labor force, the availability of raw materials, utilities and transportation.
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 14. These factors are given primary attention
when a firm chooses a new plant location. They are determinative when the firm
is choosing among nations or regions of a country. Location Incentives, supra note
11, at 522-24. Once a region has been selected, factors such as financial incentives,
taxes, and business climate play an important role in the selection of a particular
community within the region. Id.
15. See infra notes 64-101.
16. Location Incentives, supra note 11, at 536 n.150. The yield differential
between tax-exempt and taxable bonds depends on the supply of each and the
amount of tax which is expected to be avoided. Assuming that the supply of each
is equivalent and will remain constant, the differential then depends upon the
marginal tax rate. For example, if an investor is in the fifty percent bracket a tax
exempt bond of eight percent will net him the same as a taxable bond paying
sixteen percent. As the investor's marginal tax rate decreases the spread narrows.
Therefore, municipal bonds can be marketed at a lower interest rate than corporate
bonds. See generally Note, The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest by
the Federal Government, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 703 (1969) (discussion of municipal
obligations).
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of lower rental payments." Thus, under a long term lease with an
option to purchase, the lessee has acquired a newly constructed
facility at a discounted price." Moreover, for tax and accounting
purposes, the tenant treats the lease arrangements as a purchase
allowing the company to deduct a reasonable allowance for the
structure's depreciation.' 9 In most circumstances, lessees also are
relieved of the burdensome expense of registration under the Se-
curities Act of 193320 as well as state and local property taxes. 2'
IDBs were developed in what has been characterized as a coun-
terrevolutionary response to state constitutional limitations which
restricted the ability of certain states and their political subdivisions
to aid private entities by incurring debt. 22 In 1936, Mississippi became
17. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
18. The discount is the difference between the interest paid on the lessee's
taxable bonds multiplied by the costs being financed and the interest paid on the
issuer's tax-exempt bonds multiplied by the costs being financed.
19. The Code provides that "there shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)-(l) of property used in the trade or business, or (2)
of property held for the production of income." I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982). As a general
rule, lessees with leases for thirty years or longer are treated as the owner of the
facility for depreciation purposes. Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66.
20. As long as the IDBs are exempt from federal income taxation they are
exempt from registration pursuant to § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. See
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,924 (Nov. 6, 1970) (discus-
sion of IDB exemption from registration); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(2) (1982).
21. Generally, the facilities are owned by the issuing governmental unit, which
invariably is exempt from state and local property taxes. Location Incentives, supra
note 11, at 537. Often these property tax exemptions offer the lessee more in terms
of reduced costs than the reduced financing costs attributable to IDBs. See id.
Many states require the lessee to pay additional rental in an amount equal to what
the taxes would be if the project was taxable. See Mumford, The Past, Present
and Future of Industrial Development Bonds, 1 URB. LAW. 147 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Mumford].
22. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations On Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963). The restrictions
can be classified into four categories: (1) the imposition of debt ceilings; (2) the
creation of restrictive procedures for incurring debt, e.g., electorate approval; (3)
the imposition of credit clauses which prohibit loans or donations to private
individuals or corporations; and (4) restrictions on the purposes for which public
funds could be expended or for which taxes could be levied and debt incurred.
Id. at 277-81. Many of the early programs did not present a constitutional problem
because they were based on newly adopted constitutional amendments. Id. at 265-
66. Others did present a constitutional problem which was resolved by the respective
[Vol. XIII
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the first state to successfully invoke the interest exemption23 when
it authorized the issuance of IDBs to finance the acquisition of land
and the construction of commercial facilities for lease or operation
by the issuing municipality.2 4 Ten years elapsed, however, before the
next state, Kentucky, established a similar program.25 Pioneering the
industrial revenue bond, 26 Kentucky authorized the issuance of bonds
which were to be repaid solely from rents received from the lessee
of the facility. 27 In 1949, Alabama revolutionized the technique by
approving the formation of industrial boards which could issue bonds
for the purpose of inducing industrial location.2 s Notwithstanding
these innovations, IDB financing expanded only gradually during
state court. See Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 107, 178 So. 799, 807,
appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938). In Albritton, the court ruled that the
program was constitutional because the user of the financed facility was merely
an agent of the municipality, and, therefore, the bonds were indeed issued for a
public purpose. Id.
23. Generally, interest paid on obligations of states and municipalities is exempt
from taxation under I.R.C. § 103(a) (1982). See infra notes 31-32.
24. 1936 Miss. Laws, 1st Ext. Sess. ch. 1. The constitutionality of the program
was upheld in Albritton, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S.
627 (1938). Prior to Albritton, the Supreme Court on several occasions had invalidated
bond issues because the proceeds were found to be for a private purpose and not
a "public purpose." Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U.S. 487 (1883). Following the "public purpose" doctrine, courts in Tennesee
and Mississippi ruled that their states were precluded from issuing bonds to induce
industrial locations. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S.W. 29 (1925); Caruthers
v. Town of Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934). In Albritton, however,
the Mississippi court approved the issuance of industrial development bonds because
the public purpose of aiding industry was legislatively declared. Albritton, 181 Miss.
at 83, 178 So. at 805. Moreover, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack
of a substantial federal question, thus precluding further federal court review of
the validity of IDB financing. Albritton, 303 U.S. 627.
25. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 103.200 to .285 (1982 & 1984 Supp.) (enacted 1946). The
legislative authorization for the plan was upheld in Faulconer v. City of Danville,
313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950).
26. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the difference between general obligation
IDBs and revenue IDBs (IRBs). The Mississippi program, supra notes 23 and 24,
involved bonds which were secured by the full faith and credit of the issuing unit.
While technically there is a distinction between IDBs and IRBs, section 103(b)(2)
of the Code does not draw a distinction and the regulations hold that the distinction
is without tax effects. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(4), T.D.
7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18 (1983).
27. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 103.200 to .285 (1982 & 1984 Supp.) (enacted 1946).
28. ALA. CODE tit. 11, §§ 11-54-80 to -101 (1975 & 1984 Supp.) (enacted 1949).
For the first time, the function of inducing industrial development was severed
from the other operations of the municipality.
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the forties and fifties.2 9 During the sixties, however, IDB financing
mushroomed.30
B. Tax Treatment of Interest on IDBs Prior to 1968
The most significant factor in the development of IDB financing
was the tax treatment afforded interest paid on the bonds. In 1895,
the Supreme Court ruled that the tenth amendment prohibited im-
position of a federal tax on income derived from state and municipal
bonds.3 Accordingly, the federal income tax laws, when drafted in
1913, excluded interest on municipal bonds from gross income.3 2
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not publicly recognize the
tax-exempt status of IDBs, however, until 1954 when it determined
that these bonds were exempt even though the financed facilities
would be leased to a private enterprise, and interest on the bonds
29. The annual totals for all forms of IDBs, in millions of dollars, are as
follows:
Year Amount Year Amount
Pre 1951 7.25 1965 216.16
1951 9.62 1966 504
1952 7.60 1967 1315
1953 5.27 1968 1606
1954 5.02 1969 51
1955 7.28 1970 115
1956 8.23 1971 207
1957 7.08 1972 335
1958 25.84 1973 573
1959 17.99 1974 493
1960 41.02 1975 455
1961 41.27 1976 484
1962 65.93 1977 4697
1963 119.78 1978 2522
1964 192.64 1979 3837
Location Incentives, supra note 11, at 535 n.140.
30. See chart, supra note 29.
31. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing,
158 U.S. 601 (1895). In Pollock, certain provisions of the Revenue Act of 1894,
Act of 1894 ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553-54 (1895), were declared unconstitu-
tional. The Court concluded that the Act's tax on income derived from municipal
bonds was a tax on the power of the states to borrow money and, therefore, was
repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 586. See infra notes 196-232 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the vitality of the Pollock decision.
32. The interest exemption was initially codified in the original income tax act,
the Revenue Act of 1913. Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 166, 38 Stat. 114, 168 (1913).
It is now found in § 103(a) which provides that "[glross income does not include
interest on-(l) the obligations of a State . . . or any political subdivision of . .
the foregoing. . . ." I.R.C. § 103(a) (1982).
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would be paid solely from the lease revenues.33 Revenue Ruling 57-
187, 34 issued in 1957, expanded the scope of the IDB tax exemption
to include interest on obligations issued by industrial development
authorities pursuant to enabling legislation.35
While these determinations had a slight impact on the growth
of IDB issues,36 Revenue Ruling 63-20,37 was the impetus to a sub-
stantial increase in IDB financing.3" This ruling set out prospective
guidelines to be met by industrial development authorities for their
bonds to qualify for tax-exempt status.39 The proliferation of IDB-
financed projects dismayed Congress"' and the Treasury Depart-
33. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 C.B. 28.
34. Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 C.B. 65.
35. Id. The IRS ruled that bonds issued by an industrial development board
formed pursuant to Alabama legislative authority, see supra note 28, are considered
issued on behalf of a municipality and interest thereon is exempt from federal
income taxes under I.R.C. § 103(a). Rev. Rul. 57-187, supra note 34.
36. See chart, supra note 29.
37. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24.
38. See chart, supra note 29. The practice spread to industrialized states such
as Michigan and Ohio. Both the number and the size of issues grew markedly.
Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1651.
39. In 1956, the I.R.S. promulgated Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1, T.D. 6220, 1957-
1 C.B. 35, 38, which expanded I.R.C. § 103(a) to exempt obligations issues "on
behalf of" a state. Id. Under Rev. Rul. 63-20, if a non-profit corporation was
formed under a state's general non-profit corporation law for the purpose of
stimulating industrial development and satisfied five requirements, its bonds would
be considered as being issued "on behalf of" the state for purposes of Treas.
Reg. § 1.103-1. Rev. Rul. 63-20, supra note 37. The five requirements were the
following: (1) the corporation must engage in activities which are essentially public
in nature; (2) the corporation must be one which is not organized for profit; (3)
the corporate income must not inure to any private person; (4) the state or its
political subdivisions must have a beneficial interest in the corporation while the
indebtedness remains outstanding, and it must obtain full legal title to the cor-
poration's property with respect to which the indebtedness was incurred upon the
retirement of such indebtedness; and (5) the corporation must have been approved
by the state or political subdivision thereof, either of which must also have approved
the specific obligations issued by the corporations. Id.; 1963-1 C.B. at 24. One
commentator referred to this ruling as "a kind of . . . industrial revenue bond
legislation." Nelson, Tax Considerations of Municipal Industrial Incentive Financing,
45 TAxEs 941, 944 (1967).
40. Representative John Byrnes introduced legislation to amend § 103(a) to
exclude from the exemption future IDBs, and commented that IDBs
pervert the tax-exemption privilege enjoyed by State and municipal gov-
ernments. The exemption privilege ...was never intended as a means
whereby private corporations could borrow money at low interest rates
using governmental units as an "umbrella" . . . .This practice ... makes
a mockery of our tax laws. The tax-exempt status of interest on municipal
bonds must be limited to legitimate governmental functions where it is
the credit of the municipality that supports the bond not the credit of
some second party beneficiary.
1985]
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ment4I and caused scrutinization of this "truckhole ' '4 2 in the law. 3
Debate over remedial measures and reform to narrow the "truckhole"
soon followed.
Proponents of reform raised many cogent objections to the tax
exemption for IDBs. First, the exemption was considered a perversion
of the tax law since the private enterprise was actually the obligor
and the issuing governmental unit a mere conduit for tax-exempt
financing. 4 Second, the exemption eroded the federal tax base by
excluding a substantial block of capital."5 Moreover, the resulting loss
in federal tax revenues often exceeded the additional federal revenues
produced by the industrial expansion. 46 In effect, the IDB tax ex-
emption became an indirect federal subsidy because the federal
government's loss resulted in the private enterprise's gain. 47 This
indirect federal subsidy was without federal controls,48 undercut those
competitors who financed their own plant construction 49 and was
113 CoNG. REC. 19,877 (1967). Senator Abraham Ribicoff, introducing a com-
panion bill, added that the abuses were "undermining the usefulness of this method
of helping our State and local government finance their functions at the lowest
possible cost." 113 CONG. REC. 31,612 (1967).
41. The Treasury Department in Technical Information Release No. 972, dated
March 6, 1968, announced that it was reconsidering its position on the applicability
of § 103 to IDBs because the corporation was, in reality, the primary obligor.
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6648 (1968). Proposed regulations providing that
interest on IDBs would no longer be exempt from gross income were published
on March 23, 1968. Proposed Treas. Reg. 4950 (1969). Congress obviated pro-
mulgation by passing the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. Pub. L.
No. 90-364; 82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (1968); see infra notes 64-107.
42. Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures With Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truckhole" In The Tax Law, 7 STAN. L. REV. 224 (1965).
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 40-41.
45. See McDaniel, Federal Income Taxation Of Industrial Bonds: The Public
Interest, 1 URB. LAW. 157, 163-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as McDaniel].
46. The government[']s revenue loss ... is partially offset ... by the revenue
gain resulting from the fact that the private business enterprise which
receives the benefits of tax-exempt borrowing ... is a taxable entity. To
the extent that tax-exempt borrowing increases the business firm's taxable
net income, its [fQederal tax liability is increased.
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13 n.2.
47. The enterprise does not receive all the benefits of the federal revenue loss.
The purchaser of the bonds receives tax-exempt income. See McDaniel, supra note
45, at 163-64.
48. See Hendricks, Reconsideration of Industrial Development Bond Income
Tax Exemption, 48 OR. L. REV. 168, 179-81 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hendricks].
Opponents contend that this is an argument in favor of the tax exemption since
states and municipalities have the right to make their own determinations about
industrial development. Id.
49. Id. at 182. A company which uses IDBs gains a competitive advantage in
[Vol. XIII450
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inefficient because lost federal tax revenues exceeded the benefits
derived by the private enterprise.50 Third, proponents of reform
contended that the IDB exemption undermined the municipal bond
tax exemption.5" IDBs exhaust the available market for tax-exempt
bonds and inflate interest rates thereby increasing the costs of
state and local borrowing for traditional public purposes.52 Thus, tax-
payers are burdened either by increased taxes to meet increased finan-
cing costs or reduced governmental services. 3 Fourth, the exemption
was regressive and counteracted the progressive nature of the tax
structure. ' Lastly, the IDB was "a weapon in the war raging among
our States and municipalities to win new industries by offering sub-
sidies and special privileges." 55 This process of pirating industry wasted
valuable resources and had a tendency to cause communities to neglect
longer range economic development.56
Opponents of reform felt that the exemption was successful in
reducing rural unemployment.5 7 Many depressed areas had untrained
work forces, lacked proper facilities to lease to companies and had
at least two ways: (1) rental for the facilities is lower than fair market value rentals;
and (2) the plant is generally exempt from state and local property taxes. TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 729, 731 (1959) (statement
of Solomon Barkin) [hereinafter cited as TAX COMPENDIUM].
50. Location Incentives, supra note 11, at 544-45; Exempt Status, supra note
9, at 1664-66. The difference between the two figures "leaks" to the purchaser.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. See 114 CONG. REC. 7681 (statement of Senator Proxmire). In 1967, it was
estimated that tax-free IDBs "raised the cost of local government borrowing on
full-faith-and-credit bonds by about [one quarter of one] percent, and the cost of
other local government borrowing by . . . twice that much . I..." Id  at 7682 (state-
ment taken trom panel discussion at the Investment Bankers Association's Con-
vention held in December, 1967)..
53. Hendricks, supra note 48, at 179-80 (discussion of general objections to tax-
exempt IDB financing).
54. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1652. But see TAX COMPENDIUM, supra
note 49, at 763-66 (statement of Cushman McGee).
55. Id. at 733 (statement of Solomon Barkin). Many of the northern industrialized
states joined with organized labor to oppose IDB financing on this ground. See
114 CONG. REC. 7686 (statement of Senator Clark of Pennsylvania and resolution
of AFL-CIO submitted by Senator Clark).
56. TAX COMPENDIUM, supra note 49, at 733-34 (statement of Solomon Barkin).
When companies are pirated away from a community, many people are left un-
employed and facilities left unused. When, however, IDB financing results in
industrial expansion, the opposite is true. See generally 114 CONG. REC. 7688
(statement of Senator Eastland). E,/idence gathered during the sixties indicates that
plant pirating is the exception and not the general rule. ADVISORY COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 14.
57. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the alleged impact of IDB financing
on rural unemployment.
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insufficient resources to sustain industrial development." Therefore,
to attract industry and to have any chance of alleviating unem-
ployment, these areas needed IDB financing. 9 Creating jobs in these
communities also helped to reduce emigration to urban centers. 60
Furthermore, it was improper for Congress to restrict the practice
since the power of states, local governments and their political
subdivisions was "being exercised in the financing of public purposes
as determined by the highest courts of the respective States." ' 6 1
Ultimately, the debate led to the enactment of section 107 of the
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 (Act of 1968)62 which
eliminated some of the undesirable aspects of IDB financing and,
at the same time, retained its perceived benefits. 63
II. The Tax-Exempt Status of IDBs Prior to the Enactment of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
A. The 1968 Reform
The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 vitiated the
undesirable aspects of IDB financing by eliminating the federal tax
exemption for interest earned on IDBs.6 Moreover, it retained the
benefits of IDBs by reserving the small issue exemption 65 and the
activities exemption 66 from the general rule of taxability. Inquiry
58. ADVISORY COMMISION, supra note 1, at 38-40.
59. See 114 CONG. REC. 7686-87 (statement of Senator Fulbright). IDB financing
is a desirable method of inducing industrial location because the state or community's
out-of-pocket costs are minimal. Location Incentives, supra note 11, at 554. See
supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic attractions
of IDB financing from the perspective of a private company.
60. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1655. The flight of laborers from rural
areas to cities is well documented. See J. HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 48-55 (1974) (discussion of migration and urban growth).
61. TAX COMPENDIUM, supra note 49, at 766 (statement of Cushman McGee).
See supra note 24 for a discussion of the genesis of the public purpose doctrine
and its application to states' financing activities.
62. Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (1968).
63. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1655-57.
64. Section 103(a) excludes from gross income interest on certain governmental
obligations. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1982); see supra notes 31-32. Section 103(b)(1) provides
that "(except as otherwise provided) ...any industrial development bond shall be
treated as an obligation not described in subsection [103](a)(1) or (a)(2)." I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(l) (1982).
65. The small issue exemption is codified in I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (1982). See infra
notes 94-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of this provision.
66. The activities exemption is codified at sections 103(b)(4) and (b)(5) of the
Code. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4), (b)(5) (1982). See infra notes 83-93 for a discussion of
these provisions.
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into the availability of these exemptions is necessary only after it
is determined that the obligations meet the statutory definition of
"industrial development bond." 67
Section 103(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code)68
defines "industrial development bond" as any obligation:
(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion
of the proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in
any trade or business carried on by any person who is not an
exempt person... and (B) the payment of the principal or interest
on which (under the terms of such obligation or any underlying
arrangement) is, in whole or in major part-(i) secured by an
interest in property used or to be used in a trade or business or
in payments in respect of such property, or (ii) to be derived
from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, used
or to be used in a trade or business.
6 9
The Treasury regulations characterize the requirements of subsec-
tion 103(b)(2)(A) as the "trade or business test ' 70 and the require-
ments of subsection 103(b)(2)(B) as the "security interest test." '71
Both of these tests must be satisfied before a governmental obligation,
normally tax-exempt, is deemed to be a taxable iDB.72
The trade or business test focuses on the use of the proceeds of
the bond issue and prevents financing of most corporate expansions
with tax-exempt IDBs. 73 If all or a major portion of the proceeds
of the issue are used directly or indirectly in a trade or business of
a nonexempt person, the test is satisfied. 74 The regulations define
67. See generally I.R.C. § 103(b) (1982) (general Code provisions affecting IDBs).
68. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1982).
69. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (1982); see supra note 64.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18; see infra notes 73-76
and accompanying text.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(4), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18; see infra notes 77-82
and accompanying text.
72. See generally I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1982) (Code definition of 1DB).
73. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1657.
74. In determining whether a debt obligation meets the trade or business
test, the indirect, as well as the direct, use of the proceeds is to be taken
into account. For example, the debt obligations comprising a bond issue
do not fail to satisfy the trade or business test merely because the State
or local governmental unit uses the proceeds to engage in a series of
financing transactions for property to be used by private business users
in trades or businesses carried on by them. Similarly, if such proceeds
are to be used to construct facilities to be leased or sold to any nonexempt
person for use in a trade or business it carries on ... the debt obligations
comprising such issue satisfy the trade or business test.
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3)(ii), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18.
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a "major portion" as "more than 25 percent of the bond proceeds." ' ,
A nonexempt person is any person who uses the proceeds of the
issue in a related trade or business other than a governmental unit
or a tax-exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3).16
Satisfaction of the "trade or business test" alone will not result
in 1DB characterization since the "security interest test" also must
be met. The "security interest test" looks to the nature of the
security and the source of payment for the principal or interest on
the obligation.7 7 It seeks to curtail the classic IDB financing ar-
rangement where the bonds are secured only by the project and the
revenues it produces.78 If, as determined by the bond indenture79 or
the underlying agreement,80 all or a major portion of the payment
of the principal or interest is secured either by an interest in or
derived from payments with respect to property or borrowed money
used in a trade or business, the "security interest test" has been
met.' For purposes of this test, a "major portion" is twenty-five
percent.82 The major consequence of satisfying both the "trade or
business test" and the "security interest test" is that interest on the
obligation is not tax-exempt under section 103(a)83 unless it qualifies
for one of the exceptions to the general rule.
Once it is detemined that an obligation is an IDB within the
meaning of section 103(b)(2), s4 attention must be focused on qual-
ifying it for one of the statutory tax exemptions. One of the tax
75. Treas. Reg. § 103-7(b)(3)(iii), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18.
76. Section 103(b)(3) defines an exempt person as:(A) a governmental unit, or (B) an organization described in section
501(c)(3) and exempt from tax under section 501(a) (but only with respect
to a trade or business carried on by such organization which is not an
unrelated trade or business, determined by applying section 513(a) to
such organization).
I.R.C. § 103(b)(3) (1982).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.103(b)-7(b)(4), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18.
78. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
79. A bond indenture is "a written agreement under which bonds . . .are issued,
setting forth maturity date, interest rate, and other terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
693 (5th ed. 1979).
80. To ascertain the nature of the security and source of payment for the debt
service, the security interest test also requires an examination of any underlying
agreement as determined by the separate agreement of the parties of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the issuance. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(4), T.D. 7869,
1983-1 C.B. 18.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 75.
83. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1982).
84. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1982).
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exemptions for interest on IDBs arises where the proceeds of the
IDBs are used for certain exempt activities.85 This exemption reflects
a congressional determination not to impede the use of IDBs to
finance certain activities.86 Two alternative rationales have been ad-
vanced for its existence. 87 "The first . . .assume[s] . . .a federal
interest in encouraging private parties to undertake projects in the
areas of the activities specified .... Under this assumption, the
exemption[] can be viewed as a subsidy program .. ." designed
to induce participation through a reduction in financing costs.89 The
second rationale is that the, activities exempted are the type which
state or local governments have traditionally undertaken. 9° Thus,
consistency and notions of federalism require that the treatment of
the bonds used to finance these activities be the same as the treatment
afforded bonds which finance ordinary government activities. 9
Under the activities exemption, interest on IDBs is tax-exempt if
the bond proceeds are used to finance: (1) low income residential
rental property; (2) sports facilities; (3) convention or trade show
facilities; (4) airports, docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities or
parking facilities relating thereto; (5) sewage and solid waste disposal
facilities, or facilities for the local furnishing of water; (6) qualified
hydro-electric generating facilities; (7) qualified mass commuting
vehicles; or (8) local district heating or cooling facilities. 92 Addi-
85. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4), (b)(5) (1982).
86. This exemption may be required by the Constitution. See infra notes 215-
32.
87. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1664.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
90. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1666.
91. Id.
92. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4) (1982). In addition to financing one of the exempt
activities to qualify for this exemption, the following rules must be satisfied: (1)
substantially all of the proceeds must be used to finance the exempt activity, Treas.
Reg. § 103-8(a)(4), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18 ("substantially all" test); (2) the
facility must be available on a regular basis for general public use or is to be part
of a facility which meets this requirement, Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(2), T.D. 7869,
1983-1 C.B. 18 ("public use" requirement); and (3) ninety percent or more of the
bond proceeds must be for facilities constructed after the adoption of a bond
resolution or some other official action by the issuer indicating its present intent
to issue the bonds. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(5), T.D. 7869, 1983-1 C.B. 18 (timing
requirement). The timing requirement prevents reimbursement of costs incurred
prior to official action and is sometimes referred to as the "official action"
requirement. The treasury regulations define "substantially all" as ninety percent
or more of the proceeds of a issue. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(1), T.D. 7869, 1983-1
C.B. 18 (1983).
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tionally, interest on IDBs used to acquire or develop land as a site
for an industrial park is exempt. 93
If a project is not an exempt activity, it may still qualify for the
small issue exemption, which is designed to preserve IDB financing
as a method of combating unemployment. 94 The law provides a tax
exemption for interest on IDBs if the aggregate authorized face
amount of the IDBs together with certain outstanding prior issues95
is one million dollars or less and ninety percent or more of the
proceeds96 are used to acquire, construct, or improve land or de-
preciable property. 97 Alternatively, if the issue does not qualify as
a one million dollar small issue because the dollar limit is exceeded,
the issuer may elect to use a ten million dollar small issue exemption. 98
To qualify for the election, however, the sum of the face amount
of the issue together with certain prior outstanding issues99 and
certain capital expenditures'0° must not exceed ten million dollars. 10'
The exemptions authorized under the Act of 1968 were very broad,
permitting the tax-exempt financing for an infinite variety of
projects.10 2 Because of the ceiling placed on IDBs by the small issue
exemptions, the volume of IDBs fell precipitiously in the years
immediately following the passage of the Act. 103 Soon, however, the
93. I.R.C. § 103(b)(5) (1982). To qualify for this exemption the issue must satisfy
the "substantially all" test, and the "public use" and "official action" requirements.
See supra note 92.
94. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1660-62; see supra note 13.
95. Any prior tax-exempt small issue must be taken into account if the proceeds
were used primarily to finance a facility in the same jurisdiction and if the principal
user of both facilities is the same entity or a related person. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(B)
(1982).
96. Section 103(b)(6)(A) requires that
substantially all of the proceeds [be] used (i) for the acquisition, con-
struction, reconstruction, or improvement of land or property of a char-
acter subject to the allowance for depreciation, or (ii) to redeem part
or all of a prior issue which was issued for purposes described in clause
(i) or this clause.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A) (1982).
97. Id.
98. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D) (1982).
99. Those issues considered under § 103(b)(6)(B) are also considered under §
103(b)(6)(D). I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)(ii) (1982); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. Capital expenditures "paid or incurred during the six year period beginning
three years before the date of such issue and ending three years after such date"
are considered in determining whether or not the ten million dollar limit is met.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)(ii) (1982).
101. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D) (1982).
102. See generally I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (1982) (small issue exemption).
103. Location Incentives, supra note 11, at 543.
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overall volume of IDBs reached a new high.1°4 From 1962 to 1982,
the volume of IDBs increased almost seven-fold to forty-four billion
dollars.' °5 Moreover, the amount of IDBs and other private bonds
as a percentage of total borrowing by states and localities increased
from 21 to 51.7%. o6 The growth of IDBs concerned Congress
because of increasing federal revenue losses and its tendency to
inflate tax-exempt interest rates.1
0 7
B. The 1982 Reform
In 1982, Congress responded by further restricting the issuance
of tax-exempt IDBs. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA)0° imposed several new restrictions and requirements
on IDBs.' °9 It restricted small-issue IDBs in several ways. First, it
added a "sunset provision"" 0 withdrawing the small issue exemption
from obligations issued after December 31, 1986.' Second, the
"piggy-backing '1 1 2 of the one million dollar small issue was pro-
hibited." 3 The ten million dollar exemption, however, remains avail-
able for combined issues."14 Third, the exemption was eliminated for
104. Id.
105. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 612 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.
No. 432].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
109. TEFRA imposed general restrictions which apply to all § 103 obligations
and specific ones which apply solely to obligations classified as industrial development
bonds. One general restriction is that certain tax-exempt obligations must be issued
in registered form to retain their tax-exempt status. I.R.C. § 103() (1982) (added
by § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA); see infra notes 225-28.
110. A sunset law is "a statute which requires administrative bodies to justify
periodically their existence to [the] legislature." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1288
(5th ed. 1979).
Ill. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(N)(i) (1982) (added by § 214(c) of TEFRA).
112. "Piggy-backing" is a practice whereby the one million dollar small issue
is combined with an exempt activity issue, with the one million dollars being used
to finance a part of the project which does not qualify for the activities exemption.
Under the law prior to TEFRA, proceeds of IDBs used to finance exempt activities
were not taken into account when determining if the small issue limits were met.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10(d), T.D. 7840, 1982-2 C.B. 38. Therefore, piggy-backing
was permitted.
113. Section 103(b)(6)(M) provides that the small issue exemption is not available
if the obligation "is issued as part of an issue (other than an issue to which
subparagraph (D) applies) if the interest on any other obligation which is part of
such issue is excluded from gross income under any provision of law other than
this paragraph." I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(M) (1982) (added by § 214(b) of TEFRA).
114. While a small issue cannot be tacked on to an exempt activities issue, it
can be used in conjunction with a ten million dollar small issue. Id.
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bonds issued after December 31, 1982, if (1) more than twenty-five
percent of the proceeds of the issue are used to provide a facility
the primary purpose of which is retail food and beverage services,
automobile sales or service or the provision of recreation or enter-
tainment; or (2) any portion of the proceeds is used to provide golf
courses, country clubs, massage parlors, racquet sport facilities,
skating facilities, hot tub or sun tan facilities or racetracks." 5
In addition to restricting the small issue exemption, TEFRA made
several general changes in the rules concerning IDBs. First, it required
issuers to make quarterly information reports to the IRS.116 Second,
TEFRA required that IDB issuances be approved either by an elected
official in the issuing jurisdictions where the facilities would be
located or by voter referendum.1 7 Third, TEFRA required that
property placed into service on or after January 1,1983 be depreciated
using the straight line method.118 Low income residential rental prop-
erty, public sewage or solid waste disposal facilities, air or water
pollution control facilities and facilities with respect to which an
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) has been made, however,
could be depreciated under accelerated formulas.' "
The TEFRA limitations restricted the benefits associated with
certain IDB-financed projects and eliminated some of the worst
abuses associated with IDBs. 20 Yet, as Congress increasingly tried
to curtail these abuses, the rate at which IDBs were issued by state
and local governments also increased.121 In 1983, approximately twenty-
eight billion dollars in IDBs were issued, which was roughly double
the amount issued in 1980.122 Moreover, IDBs cost the federal gov-
ernment nearly five billion dollars in foregone revenues in fiscal
115. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(O) (1982) (added by § 214(e) of TEFRA).
116. l.R.C. § 103(f) (1982) (added by § 215(b)(1) of TEFRA). These reporting
requirements also apply to issuers of IDBs and issuers of other obligations. Id.
Although an issue of IDBs fits into one of the statutory exemptions, interest thereon
will not be exempt unless the requirements of this section are met. Id. Generally,
the section requires issuers to report information concerning the obligations issued,
the issuer, and the private company which is to use the finance facility. Id.
117. I.R.C. § 103(k) (1982) (added by § 215(a) of TEFRA). This is commonly
referred to as the public approval requirement.
118. I.R.C. § 168(f)(12)(A), (B) (1982) (added by § 216(a) of TEFRA).
119. I.R.C. § 168(f)(12)(C) (1982) (added by § 216(a) of TEFRA). See infra notes
153-56 for discussion of changes in the depreciation rules enacted under the Deficit
Reduction Act.
120. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 612.
121. Saunders, "$150 A Head, and Not A Penny More," FORBES, Nov. 19,
1984, at 56.
122. Id.
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year 1984.123 In response to this dilemma and to prevent further
unrestrained growth in IDBs, Congress enacted new limitations and
restrictions on the issuance of IDBs as part of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984.124 This Note continues with an evaluation of the new
"IDB killing provisions"' 25 and concludes with analysis mandating
the retention of tax-exempt IDB financing.
IV. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
To further curtail unrestrained growth in IDBs, the Tax-Exempt
Bond Provisions'26 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (1984 Act)
place extirpative restrictions and limitations on the issuance of IDBs.' 27
Congress restricted both the supply of and demand for these ob-
ligations. The former is achieved through a state wide ceiling on
the issuance of tax-exempt private activity bonds.' 28 Restrictions on
the users of the bonds proceeds and the projects which could be
financed accomplishes the latter.' 29
The maximum amount of private activity bonds that a state and
its localities can issue per calendar year is the greater of (1) $150
multiplied by the state's population and (2) $200 million dollars.'30
The $150 ceiling will continue until 1987 when it will be reduced
to $100 per capita.' 3' Interest on bonds issued in excess of the state's
allotment will not be exempt from federal taxes 3 2 unless such bonds
are exempt from the ceiling determination.'33 Bonds used to finance
the following facilities are not counted in determining a state's level
of private activity bonds: (1) low income residential rental property
123. Id.
124. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
125. Froehlich, Congress Adopts 1DB Restrictions: The Tax-Exempt Bond Pro-
visions of the Deficit Reduction of 1984, 25 MUN. ATTY. 7-9 (1984).
126. Title VI of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 494 (1984).
127. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1682.
128. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 153-95 and accompanying text.
130. I.R.C. § 103(n)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act (DRA)).
131. I.R.C. § 103(n)(4)(c) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
132. I.R.C. § 103(n)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
133. The state ceiling applies to "private activity bonds." I.R.C. § 103(n)(1) (West
Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA). IDBs generally are private activity bonds.
I.R.C. § 103(n)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA). Certain IDBs,
however, are excluded from the definition of a private activity bond. See I.R.C.
§ 103(n)(7)(B)-(D) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
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as defined in section 103(b)(4)(A);' 34 (2) public housing pursuant to
section 11(b) of the Housing Act of 1937;'" (3) convention or trade
facilities; and (4) airports, docks, wharves and mass commuting
facilities. 13 6 While the ceiling is generally effective for obligations
issued after 1983, there are exceptions.'37 Moreover, for those states
whose annualized per capital issuance of IDBs and student loan
bonds subject to the volume limitation during the first nine months
of 1983 was more than $150, a special phase-in rule applies.' 38
The Deficit Reduction Act allocates the ceiling among the various
governmental units. 39 As a general rule, fifty percent of the volume
ceiling is allocated to the state agency or agencies with authority to
issue the bonds. 4 The remaining fifty percent is assigned to local
jurisdictions based on the ratio of their population to that of the
state's total population. 4' Where there are overlapping governmental
units, an area will be treated as being only within the jurisdiction
of the unit having the smallest geographic area. 42 However, one
unit can surrender all or part of its jurisdiction for a calendar year
to the unit with which it shares overlapping jurisdiction. 43
A state may elect to carry forward unused portions of its annual
private activity bond ceiling for specific projects usually for up to
three years.' 4 4 Once the election is made, it is irrevocable. 45 Obli-
gations issued in the carry forward periods are not counted toward
the state's ceiling for those years to the extent that the proceeds
from the obligations are used to finance the project specified in the
election. 46 The unused bond ceiling is absorbed in the order in which
the obligations for the specified projects are issued. 47
134. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) (1982).
135. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, ch. 896 (1937).
136. I.R.C. § 103(n)(7)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
137. Exceptions from the state ceilings exist with respect to bonds preliminarily
approved by inducement resolution or other means prior to June 19, 1984, id.,
and those considered refunding issues. Under section 103(n)(7)(D), the term private
activity bond does not include any obligation to the extent that the obligation
generally is issued to refund another obligation. I.R.C. § 103(n)(7)(D) (West Supp.
1984) (added by § 621 of DRA); see supra note 133.
138. I.R.C. § 103(n)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
139. I.R.C. § 103(n)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
140. Id.
141. I.R.C. § 103(n)(3) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
142. I.R.C. § 103(n)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA); .R.C.
§ 103A(g)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1984) (as amended by § 614 of DRA).
143. Id.
144. 1.R.C. § 103(n)(10) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
145. I.R.C. § 103(n)(10)(D) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
146. I.R.C. § 103(n)(10)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
147. I.R.C. § 103(n)(10)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 621 of DRA).
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In accord with congressional intent, the volume ceilings will restrain
growth of tax-exempt bonds without unnecessarily impinging on state
and local prerogatives. 14 Congress recognized that the decision as
to which projects should be financed would best be made by the
appropriate state or local agency.' 9 Nevertheless, the ceiling is clearly
the most destructive provision of the 1984 Act especially with respect
to small communities. IDBs often represent the primary means by
which state and local governments attract industry to a particular
location. 5 ' Rural areas often are deficient in credit facilities and
leasable structures of substantial size.'' IDBs allow these under-
developed areas to compete with larger urban centers for the location
of industrial expansion. The 1984 Act, however, has handicapped
small communities' efforts to develop economically by allocating
them a relatively small share of the local portion of the state bond
ceiling, especially where a substantial project is contemplated. 5 2 They
are forced, therefore, to develop strong ties with state agencies so
that they can utilize these agencies' share of the ceiling. It is un-
fortunate that Congress chose to curtail the growth of IDBs at the
expense of those communities which need to use the technique the
most.
To complement the supply restriction effected by the volume
ceiling, the 1984 Act attempts to curtail the demand for tax-exempt
financing as well. In part, this curtailment is accomplished by ex-
tending restrictions and limitations already in the Code. " ' Previously,
all but four categories of facilities financed with IDBs were required
to be depreciated under the straight line method.5 4 The 1984 Act,
however, extends the straight line depreciation requirement to three
of the four exemptions, retaining only the exception for low income
rental residential projects.' With respect to the other facilities-
municipal sewage or solid waste facilities, air or water pollution
control facilities and facilities also financed with a UDAG- Congress
148. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1683.
149. Id.
150. See 114 CONG. REc. 7688 (statement of Senator Eastland) (discussion of
economic development that occurred in Mississippi as result of IDB financing).
151. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 11. A study of the factors influencing
industrial location revealed that the availability of buildings and other property
ranked near the top and financial aid near the bottom. Id. at 39.
152. See I.R.C. § 103(n)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1984).
153. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notds 118-19 and accompanying text.
155. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(12)(C) (West Supp. 1984) (as amended by § 628(b)(1)
of the DRA).
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concluded that the benefits of tax-exempt financing and accelerated
depreciation were unnecessarily large. 56
The 1984 Act also broadened the "substantial user"' 57 restrictions.
1 58
Currently, interest on IDBs, which otherwise would be tax-exempt,
is taxable for any period during which the bonds are held by a
person who is a substantial user of the financed property or is a
person related to the substantial user. 59 Prior law defined related
persons to include family members, individuals and controlled cor-
porations or controlled partnerships, and corporations or partnerships
subject to common control.160 The 1984 Act extended this definition
to include a partnership, general or limited, and all of its partners
and their spouses and minor children and an "S corporation ' ' 6' and
each of its shareholders and their spouses and minor children.'
62
The 1984 Act also restricted the amount of IDB proceeds which
could be used to acquire land and existing property. 163 Under prior
law, IDBs could be used to finance the aquisition of land if the
land were used for an exempt purpose' 64 or if the small issue
exemption rules were met. 65 Section 103(b)(16)(A) now denies IDB
tax exempt status if (1) any portion of the proceeds is used to
acquire land used for farming; or (2) if twenty-five percent or more
of the proceeds are used to acquire land not used for farming.
66
The terms of the bond indenture, generally, will govern in determining
which proceeds are allocable to the purchase of land.' 67 If the
156. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1685.
157. A "substantial user" is any nonexempt person who regularly uses such facility
in his trade or business. If the facility is constructed, reconstructed or acquired
specifically for a nonexempt person, such person is a substantial user. See Ltr. Rul.
813214.
158. 1.R.C. § 103(b)(13) (West Supp. 1984) (as amended by § 628(d) of the DRA).
159. Id.
160. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(7)-(10) (1982).
161. "[T]he term 'S corporation' means, with respect to any taxable, a small
business corporation for which an election under section 1362(a) is in effect." I.R.C.
§ 1361 (1982).
162. I.R.C. § 103(b)(13) (West Supp. 1984) (as amended by § 628(d) of the DRA).
163. I.R.C. § 103(b)(16)-(17) (West Supp. 1984) (added by §§ 627(a) and 627(b)
of the DRA, respectively).
164. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text for discussion of activities
exemption.
165. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text for discussion of small issue
exemption.
166. I.R.C. § 103(b)(16)(A) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 627(a) of the DRA).
Exceptions exist for first time farmers and for certain land acquired in connection
with an airport, mass transit, or port development, if such land is acquired essentially
for environmental purposes, for example, wetland preservation or noise abatement.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(16)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 627(a) of the DRA).
167. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1692-93.
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indenture makes no provision for this allocation, the proceeds will
be deemed to be used for the purchase of land and other property
in relation to the fair market values of the properties. 6s
Similar restrictions are placed on the aquisition of existing property.
Under the 1984 Act, interest on IDBs will not be excluded from
gross income if any portion of the proceeds of the issue is used to
acquire existing facilities.169 This prohibition does not apply where
expenses incurred for rehabilitating any property, buildings and
equipment, are fifteen percent or more of the portion of the cost
of acquiring the property financed with IDBs."7 ° The rehabilitation
expenditures need not be financed with the tax-exempt bond pro-
ceeds.171 Additionally, no portion of the bond proceeds may be used
to finance airplanes, stadium luxury boxes, health clubs, gambling
establishments or liquor stores. 7 2
Restricting the amount of small issue IDBs on per beneficiary and
per project bases is another method employed by Congress to con-
strict demand for IDB financing. 73 Where a beneficiary of a proposed
issue already has received significant tax-exempt proceeds in a given
period, he will be denied use of the small issue exemption. 74 During
the three year period described in the Code, "5 the maximum amount
of 1DB financing that any one beneficiary is entitled to receive is
forty million dollars. 7 6 A beneficiary is defined as any person who
168. Id.
169. I.R.C. § 103(b)(17)(A) (West Supp. 1984).
170. I.R.C. § 103(b)(17)(B) (West Supp. 1984). The Code defines rehabilitation
expenditure as "any amount properly chargeable to capital account[s] which is
incurred by the person acquiring the building or property." I.R.C. § 103(b)(17)(C)(i)
(West Supp. 1984). The expenditure must be incurred within two years of the later
of the date when the property was acquired or the date the obligations were issued.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(17)(C)(iii) (West Supp. 1984).
171. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1692. For example, assume the cost
of acquiring is one million dollars and eight hundred thousand dollars of the cost
of the building is financed with IDBs. To qualify for this exemption, at least one
hundred and twenty thousand dollars must be spent for rehabilitating the property.
The one hundred and twenty thousand dollars may be spent from either the remaining
proceeds of an IDB issue or from the developers own funds.
172. I.R.C. § 103(b)(18) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 627(c) of the DRA).
The Act is not intended to prohibit IDB financing of a stadium solely because
sky boxes are included in the project. The Act merely prohibits the use of IDB
proceeds to finance the sky boxes. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1693.
173. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
174. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(A) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 623 of the DRA).
175. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(D) (West Supp. 1984). The three-year period begins on
the later of the date such facilities were placed into service or the date of the
issue. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(A) (West Supp. 1984). The small issue exemption will
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is a user of the bond financed facilities. 177 This per beneficiary ceiling
favors first time users and reflects congressional animus for large
projects.'78
Implicit in the small issue exceptions are per project limitations. 179
Nevertheless, under prior law, developers could circumvent these
limitations through division of ownership. 80 Under current law, where
multiple issues of IDBs are used to finance a single building, an
enclosed shopping mall, or a strip of offices, stores or residential
property which use substantially common facilities, the issues are
treated as a single issue for the purpose of determining whether it
qualifies under the small issue exemption. Also, all principal users
of any of the facilities financed with the issue are treated as principal
users of a single facility.'' Thus, qualification for the small issue
exemption is determined by measuring the capital expenditures and
outstanding obligations of all principal users of that project.' 8 2
Finally, the 1984 Act seeks to prevent the use of two practices
which magnify the financial benefits associated with tax-exempt fi-
nancing. It denies IDBs tax-exempt status where the proceeds are
federally guaranteed,'83 and it limits arbitraging. 8 4 Congress was
not apply to an issue if the portion of the issue allocable to a beneficiary, increased
by portions of other outstanding issues allocable to him under I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(B),
exceeds forty million dollars. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(A) (West Supp. 1984). Generally,
where two or more persons are owners or users of a facility financed with IDBs
which remain outstanding, a person is allocated a portion of the outstanding issues
in proportion to his use or ownership of the facility. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(C)(ii)
(West Supp. 1984).
177. I.R.C. § 103(b)(15)(D) (West Supp. 1984). All related persons are treated
as one user. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1691.
178. While the fact that "the beneficial impact on employment is proportionately
most significant in the smaller projects financed by IDB's," Exempt Status, supra
note 9, at 1660, there is no evidence that there are diminishing returns on a per
beneficiary basis. Therefore, this restriction may be unwarranted.
179. The overall dollar limitations of the exemptions coupled with the rules for
determining whether or not the dollar limitations have been exceeded, generally, limit
the amount of 1DB proceeds which can be expended for a given project. See supra
notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
180. Under prior law, in applying the limits small issues were taken into account
if they were located in the same incorporated municipality or same county as the
facility and the principal user of such facility was the same person or two or more
related persons. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(E) (1982). Thus, developers of shopping centers,
for example, could avoid these limitations by dividing ownership of the stores among
various unrelated companies and each could qualify for a small issue exemption.
181. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(P) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 628(c) of the DRA).
182. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1694.
183. I.R.C. § 103(h) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 622 of the DRA).
184. See infra note 190 and accompanying text for definition of arbitrage. See
generally I.R.C. § 103(c) (1982) (arbitrage provisions).
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concerned about the double subsidy created when tax-exempt fi-
nancing is combined with federal guarantees.'85 Since federally guar-
anteed tax-exempt bonds are more attractive than United States
treasury securities, which are taxable, and other state and local
obligations which do not have federal guarantees, the proliferation
of such bonds would make it difficult for both federal and state
governments to raise needed funds. 86 The 1984 Act, therefore, elim-
inates the tax exemption for bonds where a substantial portion of
the issue is to be guaranteed directly or indirectly by the federal
government.' 87 This change applies to tax-exempt bonds the proceeds
of which are deposited in federally insured financial institutions. 8'
The 1984 Act also tightened the arbitrage provisions which apply
to IDBs. 189 Arbitrage is the difference between the interest paid on
the obligations and the rate of income earned on investments made
with the bond proceeds. 19° A tax-exempt issue of IDBs must satisfy
the arbitrage rules to retain its tax-exempt status. 19' Prior law per-
mitted investment of IDB proceeds for a temporary period at an
unrestricted yield while the project was diligently pursued.192 The
Bond Provisions reduce the temporary and minor portion periods
to six months after their issuance.' 93 Profits made thereafter must
be rebated to the United States Treasury.' 94 The new arbitrage pro-
visions do not, however, apply to obligations issued to provide low
income residential rental property or any obligation issued pursuant
to section 11(b) of the United States Housing Act of 1937.19
V. Justifying Retention of the IDB Tax-Exemption
The limitations and restrictions imposed on the issuance of tax-
exempt IDBs under TEFRA and the 1984 Act undoubtedly will
curtail the growth in the dollar volume of IDBs. In this respect,
the sunset provision for the small issue exemption' 96 and the state
185. H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1685-86.
186. Id.
187. I.R.C. § 103(h) (West Supp. 1984).
188. I.R.C. § 103(h)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1984).
189. 1.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(F) (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 624(a) of the DRA).
190. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(2) (1982).
191. I.R.C. § 103(C)(6)(A) (1982).
192. I.R.C. § 103(c) (1982); H. REP. No. 432, supra note 105, at 1678-79. A minor
portion could be invested for a longer period. Id.
193. I.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(F)(ii) (West Supp. 1984).
194. I.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(D) (West Supp. 1984).
195. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, ch. 896 (1937); I.R.C. §
103(c)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1984).
196. See supra note I11 and accompanying text.
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volume ceilings 97 are the most devastating Code modifications. The
small issue exemption will expire, generally, at the end of 1986,198
but it will remain effective until the end of 1988 for obligations
issued to finance manufacturing facilities. 199 Under current law, since
the small issue exemption ultimately will expire, the future of tax-
exempt IDB financing lies in the acquisition, construction and re-
habilitation of exempt activities. Unfortunately, however, the Treas-
ury's tax reform plan contains a two-pronged attack on tax-exempt
bonds and, if enacted, the plan would virtually eliminate the activities
exemption.200 This Note concludes that the activities exemption should
be retained and the small issue exemption for manufacturing facilities
extended on grounds of efficiency and notions of state sovereignty.
A. Efficiency
The Treasury's plan to simplify the tax laws would, if enacted,
eliminate tax-exempt financing of "private purposes." A "private
purpose" is defined as the use of more than one percent of the
proceeds of the bonds, directly or indirectly, by any person other
than a state or local government. 20 The plan would deny the use
of tax-exempt IDBs to finance activities such as publicly owned
convention and trade show facilities, airports, docks, wharves, mass
transportation, and water, sewage, and solid waste facilities. 20 2 The
Treasury Department contends that these projects do not serve a
public purpose. 203 This contention is incorrect because the same types
of projects financed at the federal level are deemed to serve a valid
public purpose. 204 Essentially, the plan would eliminate the IDB
activities exemption. Such a result would undermine the two ra-
tionales which allegedly mandate the existence of this exemption. 205
One rationale for the existence of the small issue exemption and
the activities exemption reflects a congressional determination to
subsidize indirectly economic development and the construction of
197. See supra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
198. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(N) (1982); see supra note III and accompanying text.
199. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(N)(ii) (West Supp. 1984) (as amended by § 630 of the DRA).
"Manufacturing facility" is defined as "any facility which is used in the manufac-
turing or production of tangible personal property." I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(N)(iii) (1982).
200. See infra notes 201-05.
201. Bond Buyer, Dec. 4, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
202. Bond Buyer, Feb. 8, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
203. Bond Buyer, Jan. 3, 1985, § 1, at 14, col. 3.
204. Id.
205. See infra notes 206-32.
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essential facilities. 2° Under this rationale, the exemptions should be
retained if IDB financing is an efficient method to achieve either
economic development or the construction of essential facilities.
Critics of the IDB tax-exemption contend that IDB financing is an
inefficient subsidy. 27 The inefficiency lies in the fact that a portion
of the tax-exempt benefit "leaks" to the purchaser of the bonds.208
They conclude that because a direct payment to the private enterprise
will cost the federal government less money than tax-exempt IDBs,
the tax-exemption should be revoked in favor of a direct subsidy
program.209
Although the contention of inefficiency is correct, it is not clear
that direct federal subsidies are a proper substitute for IDBs. Federal
subsidy programs are extremely inefficient since large portions of
the appropriated funds are allocated to administrative costs. 210 More-
over, it is difficult for federal administrators to deploy the program's
resources optimally because they must speculate as to the relative
needs of states and their municipalities. Federal programs react slowly
to perceived local needs, and when the federal government is fi-
nancing the facility, local governments tend to be less cautious when
deciding which projects really need to be built. 21' Alternatively, IDBs
are issued and administered by state and local officials who are
more attuned to the needs of their respective communities.21 2 Self-
determination of needs using tax-exempt financing to respond to
these needs leads to a much shorter period between recognition and
provision. 2 3 Thus, there is justification under this rationale to urge
Congress to continue the existence of the activities exemption. More-
over, since newly-constructed manufacturing facilities spur economic
development and alleviate unemployment,1 4 the small issue exemption
should be extended beyond 1988 for manufacturing facilities. The
trend in Congress over the past sixteen years, however, has been to
206. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
209. McDaniel, supra note 45, at 163-65.
210. But see URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACTION GRANT PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T. OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1979) (discussion of
effectiveness of UDAG program).
211. Friedlander, A Case For Municipal Bond Tax Exemption, Bond Buyer, Nov.
26, 1984, §1, at 8, col. I [hereinafter cited as Friedlander].
212. 114 CONG. REC. 7686-87 (statement of Senator Fulbright); id. at 7688-90 (state-
ment of Senator Eastland) (discussing that it is best to allow local officials to
respond to needs of their communities).
213. Friedlander, supra note 211, at 14, col. 1.
214. See supra notes 12-13, 57-59.
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limit the tax-exempt status of IDBs making continuation of the
exemptions under this rationale unlikely.
B. Notions of State Sovereignty
A second rationale for the existence of the activities exemption
is based on principles of state sovereignty; since the IDBs are used
to finance "quasi-governmental public functions, the treatment of the
bonds used to finance them should be the same as the treatment given
to bonds which finance ordinary government activity." 2 '5 This rationale
assumes, therefore, that Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.11 6
still prohibits a tax on interest derived from governmental obligations2 '
and that Pollock protects interest on IDBs used to finance public
activities in which private participation is indispensible to their
operation. 8
The only attempt by the federal government to impose a tax on
state and local bond interest was declared unconstitutional in
Pollock. ' 9 The Pollock decision was based on the theory of inter-
governmental tax immunity first enunciated in McCulloch v.
Maryland.220 Although the vitality of the theory has "waned, ' 221
Pollock repeatedly has been cited as good law.22 2 In South Carolina
v. Regan,223 the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to re-
consider the Pollock decision.22 4 South Carolina filed a petition with
the Court requesting it to exercise original jurisdiction and hold that
section 310(b)(l) of TEFRA is unconstitutional. 225 Section 310(b)(1)
215. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1666.
216. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586, aff'd on rehear-
ing, 158 U.S. 601 (1985).
217. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
218. Exempt Status, supra note 9, at 1667.
219. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586.
220. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the Court held that Maryland
constitutionally could not tax the Bank of the United States because the power to
tax could be used to undermine the Supremacy Clause by destroying the Bank.
Id. at 425-37.
221. Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L.
REv. 633 (1959).
222. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 417 (1938); Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386 (1938); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,
283 U.S. 570, 577 (1931); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 255 (1920); South Carolina
v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 453 (1905); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 117
(1900). Although cases have narrowed the intergovernmental theory, they have
repeatedly cited Pollock as good. law. Id.
223. 104 S. Ct. 1107 (1984) (petition for original jurisdiction granted).
224. Id.; see infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
225. South Carolina, 104 S. Ct. at 1124. The Court granted the petition. Id.
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provides that the federal income tax exemption for interest on certain
municipal bonds will not be allowed unless they are issued in reg-
istered form.2 26 South Carolina raises two constitutional claims:
[First,] [vliewing its borrowing power as essential to the mainte-
nance of its separate and independent existence, South Carolina
contends that the condition imposed by 310(b)(1) on the exercise
of that power violates the Tenth Amendment.[227 Second,] .. .
relying on Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Company South
Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the interest on the
obligations of a state. Because section 310(b)(1) imposes a tax on
the interest earned on state obligations issued in bearer form, the
state argues that the section is unconstitutional. 228
The classic statement of the constitutional basis of the immunity
of the states and their municipalities from federal taxation of their
bond interest is that
[a] municipal corporation is the representative of the [sitate and
one of the instrumentalities of state government. It was long ago
determined that the property and revenues of municipal corpora-
tions are not subjects of federal taxation. . . .It is contended that
although the property or revenues of the States or their instrumen-
talities cannot be taxed, nevertheless the income derived from
... municipal securities can be taxed. But we think the same want
of power to tax . . . exists in relation to a tax on the income from
their securities, and for the same reason, and that reason is given
by Chief Justice Marshall in Weston v. Charleston .. .where he
said: "The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made,
must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and
have a sensible influence on the contract. . . . To any extent
• ..it is a bur[d]en on the operations of government. It may be
carried to an extent which shall arrest them entirely". . . . Apply-
ing this language to these municipal securities, it is obvious that
taxation on the interest therefrom would operate on the power to
borrow before it is exercised, and would have a sensible influence
on the contract, and that the tax in question is a tax on the power
of the States and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and con-
sequently repugnant to the Constitution.22 9
Pollock should not be overruled, for even today, "the power to
tax is the power to destroy. ' 230 If taxation of interest were permitted,
226. The provision was codified in I.R.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982).
227. South Carolina, 104 S. Ct. at 1111.
228. Id.
229. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 584-86.
230. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
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the federal government taking this power to the extreme, could
effectively destroy states' and municipalities' ability to borrow money.
Although Justice Stevens recently questioned its vitality,23' presumably
Pollock is still, and will remain, good law. A continued exemption
for interest paid on exempt activity IDBs, therefore, may be jus-
tifiable under Pollock if the projects to be financed are public projects
in which private participation is indispensible. 23 2
Certainly, IDBs providing mass commuting facilities, sewage and
solid waste disposal facilities and facilities for the furnishing of water
are as necessary and benefit the public as much as municipal bonds
used to finance new roads and parks. Once it is agreed that a
facility is necessary, the fact that facilities are to be run by private
entities should not be dispositive of whether Pollock protects interest
paid on these obligations. Instead, the practical realities of these
arrangements should govern. Where a project is necessary, it should
be provided by a state or its instrumentalities, especially where the
issuing unit is relieved of the burden of managing the facility, in
same manner that it provides its other essential facilities- through
tax-exempt financing. Therefore, since the states are exercising their
power to borrow money in the financing of public purposes as
determined by the legislatures and the highest courts of their re-
spective states, principles of state sovereignty as enunciated in Pollock
require that certain IDBs remain tax-exempt.
VI. Conclusion
For almost fifty years, industrial development bonds have provided
state and local governments and their instrumentalities with a useful
means of facilitating economic development and alleviating unem-
ployment. Although Congress has uncovered abuses connected with the
use of this financing technique, it should remain a viable mechanism
for financing industrial expansion and essential public facilities. Rather
than completely withdrawing the small issue exemption in 1988,
Congress should retain the exemption for obligations issued to finance
manufacturing facilities. Moreover, in light of notions of state sov-
ereignty, legislators should resist the temptation to abrogate the entire
activities exemption under the guise of major tax reform.
Scott W. Bernstein
231. South Carolina, 104 S. Ct. at 1127.
232. Id.
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